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Redeemer University College
Ancaster, Ontario, Canada
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Author(s): Richard J.
Title: HE SHINES IN ALL THAT'S FAIR
Subtitle: Culture and Common Grace (the 2000 Stob Lectures)
Place of publication: Grand Rapids, Michigan / Cambridge, U.K.
Publisher: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company
Date of publication: 2001
1. Thinking about Commonness 1
2. Lessons from the "Labadists" 9
3. "He Shines in All That's Fair" 31
4. "Infra-" versus "'Supra-" 53
5. Seeking the Common Good 75
6. Updating Common Grace Theology 89
[last page is numbered 101]
INDEX This book has no index.
How do Christians account for the widespread presence of goodness in a fallen world? Different theological perspectives have presented a range of answers to this fundamental question over the centuries. In He Shines in All That's Fair Richard Mouw brings the historic insights of Calvinism to bear on this question and reinterprets them for a broader audience at the turn of the twenty-first century. Mouw examines long-standing Reformed arguments between those who champion the doctrine of common grace and those who emphasize an antithesis between the church and the world. Defenders of common grace account for the goodness in the world by insisting that God's grace goes beyond salvation to more general gifts of beauty, virtue, an excellence to all human beings -- including those who do not believe in God. Those who reject the doctrine of common grace, on the other hand, emphasize the fallenness of the world and the need for the church to maintain a dramatic contrast to it. These divergent theological perspectives, while seemingly remote and abstract, lead to questions with very practical implications: What common ground do Christians share with those outside the faith? How should Christians treat their non-Christian neighbors? How should Christians relate to the world around them? Does God disapprove when Christians form close friendships with people. who are "of the world"? Should Christians identify with the joys and sorrows of those who do not confess Christ as their Savior and Lord? In the course of this book Mouw looks at these topics, connecting the larger theological discussions to pressing issues in contemporary society. He insists that we have much to learn from thinkers who have rejected the idea of common (non-saving) grace, but he also defends the traditional common grace teachings, showing how they provide an important basis for wrestling with key challenges in present-day culture. Ultimately, Mouw argues forcefully for a Calvinism that is capable of standing in awe before the mysteries of God's gracious dealings with all human beings -- and indeed the whole creation.
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Title: De leer van de mens
Subtitle: Proeve van een christelijk-wijsgerige antropologie
Place of publication: Amsterdam
Publisher: Buijten en Schipperheijn
Date of publication: 1986
Edition: This book is the trade edition of a dissertation entitled "Christelijke transcendentaal-antropologie: Een sympathetische-kritische studie van de wijsgerige antropologe van Herman Dooyeweerd."
1. De kosmologische antropologle van Dooyeweerd 13
1. 1. Prolegomena 13
1. 1. 1. Inleiding 13
1.1.2. Dooyeweerds antropologische werk 17
1.1.3. De plaats van de antropologie 21
1.1.4. Wijsgerige tegenover `bijbelse' en theologische antropologie 26
1.1.5. Historische achtergrond 30
1.2. Antropocentrische kosmologie 34
1.2.1. De transcendentale denkkritlek 34
1.2.2. Antropologie en religie 40
1.2.3. De religieuze grondmotieven 43
1.2.4. De modaliteiten- en entiteitenleer 50
2. De modale structuur van het psychische 55
2.1. De psychische modaliteit bij Dooyeweerd 55
2.1.1. De zinkern van de psychische modaliteit 55
2.1.2. De analogieën in de psychische modaliteit 62
2.1.3. Enkele psychische analog1ën in andere
2.2. De psychische modaliteit bij geestverwanten 75
2.2.1. De zinkern van de psychische modaliteit 7e
2.2.2. De analogieën in de psychische modaliteit 89
2.3. Het psychologisch en neurobiologisch onderzoek 91
2.3. 1. De onderhavige psychologische terminologie 92
2.3.2. De driedeligheid van de hersenen 99
2.4. Een perceptieve en een sensitieve modaliteit 106
2.4.1. Getypiseerde perceptiviteit en sensitiviteit 106
2.4.2. Antinomieën in het postulaat van één psychische modaliteit 113
2.4.3. De modale structuur van de perceptieve en de sensitieve modaliteiten 118
3. Het modale ontsluitingsproces in de menselijke ontwikkeling 127
3. 1. De theorie van de modale ontsluiting 127
3. 1. 1. Open en gesloten modale structuren 127
3.1.2. De ontsluiting van de pistische en historische functie 131
3.2. Voor-spiritieve ontsluiting in de menselijke ontwikkeling 136
3.2.1. Prenatale voor-spiritieve ontsluiting 136
3.2.2. Postnatale voor-spiritieve ontsluiting 140
3.3. Vroeg-spiritieve ontsluiting in de menselijke ontwikkeling 146
3.3.1. De historische modaliteit 146
3.3.2. De logische modaliteit 153
3.3.3. De linguale modaliteit 157
3.4. Laat-spiritieve ontsluiting in de menselijke ontwikkeling 163
3.4.1. De sociale modaliteit 163
3.4.2. De economische modaliteit 168
3.4.3. De esthetische modaliteit 170
3.4.4. De juridische modaliteit 175
3.4.5. De ethische modaliteit 179
4. De leer der humaanstructuren 186
4.1. De lagere humaanstructuren 186
4. 1. 1. Inleiding 186
4.1.2. De fysische structuur 192
4.1.3. De biotische structuur 197
4.1.4. De perceptieve structuur 206
4.1.5. De sensitieve structuur 211
4.2. Despiritieve structuur 217
4.2.1. Inleiding 217
4.2.2. Acten 223
4.2.3. Grondrichtingen 232
4.2.4. Bewustzijn 243
4.2.5. Karakter 249
5. De leer van het menselijk Ik 261
5.1. De leer der supertemporaliteit 261
5.1.1. De idee van het Archimedisch punt 261
5.1.2. De idee van de supratemporaliteit van het hart 267
5.1.3. De uitwerking van de nieuwe tijdsvisie 274
5.2. Ziel/geest en lichaam 285
5.2. 1. De ziel: begrip of idee? 285
5.2.2. De aristotelisch-thomistische zielsopvatting 294
5.2.3. Confrontatie van het accommodatie- en het reformatiestandpunt 304
5.2.4. Schepping en wording 312
5.3. Oriëntatie aan de Schrift 320
5.3. 1. Biblicisme en theologisme 320
5.3.2. Hart, ziel, geest 326
5.3.3. Zondeval en verlossing 334
5.3.4. Doorwerking en voleinding 342
6. De controverse rond Dooyeweerds Ik-leer 346
6.1. Kritiek van vroege medestanders 346
6.1.1. Vollenhoven 346
6.1.2. Popma 358
6.1.3. Spier 367
6.1.4. Stoker 376
6.2. Oudere kritiek van niet-medestanders 380
6.2. 1. Albers 380
6.2.2. Schilder en Nieboer 388
6.3. Recentere kritiek 394
6.3. 1. Nederlands-Zuidafrikaanse discussie 394
6.3.2. Noordamerikaanse critici 397
6.3.3. Recente Nederlandse critici 404
6.3.4. Steen 409
7. Nabeschouwing 418
Aangehaalde literatuur 440
1. Herman Dooyeweerd 440
II. Andere auteurs 443
Curriculum vitae 455
[last page is numbered 455]
This book has no index.
Wat is de mens? Een vraag van alle tijden, want het ligt in de aard van de mens -- als enige van Gods schepselen -- zichzelf te beschouwen, nieuwsgierig te zijn naar zijn oorsprong en zijn bestemming. De vraag naar de grond van het menselijk bestaan is in onze tijd, waarin de mensheid in een diepe geestelijke crisis verkeert, existentieel van aard. Zij is als een noodkreet geworden. Waarachtige zelfkennis is de mens eerst mogelijk op basis van goddelijke openbaring. Op het fundament van dit grondmotief is een christelijk-wijsgerige mensleer te bouwen. Dooyeweerd heeft, als vervolg op zijn magistrale kosmologie, een antropologie willen opbouwen uit het schriftuurlijk grondmotief van de Reformatie, zoals hij het zelf uitdrukte. Hoewel hij dit bouwwerk niet heeft kunnen optrekken, heeft hij wel veel voorbereidend werk verricht. Zijn transcendentale denkkritiek, zijn leer van de modale aspecten der werkelijkheid en van de individualiteitsstructuren en zijn concept van de enkaptische vervlechtingen, zijn van groot belang voor de antropologie. Kritisch voortbouwend op dit werk van Dooyeweerd heeft dr. W.J. Ouweneel deze "De leer van de mens" geschreven. Na bespreking van de grondvragen van de antropologie, gaat hij in op de modale structuren van het psychische (waarbij hij onderscheidt tussen een perceptieve en een sensitieve modaliteit), het historisch ontsluitingsproces van de modale aspecten in de menselijke ontwikkeling, de individualiteitsstructuren van de mens ("humaanstructuren") en Dooyeweerds Ik-leer. Tegenover veel critici verdedigt dr. Ouweneel de supratemporaliteit van het menselijk hart, als onmisbaar onderdeel in een christelijk-wijsgerige mensleer: "Slechts door de ziel te zien als boventijdelijk en bovenmodaal concentratiepunt in de mens, waarin de mens in een religieuze afhankelijkheidsrelatie tot zijn Schepper staat, is een recht (wijsgerig) inzicht in het wezen en functioneren van het mens-zijn mogelijk."
Summary: Christian Transcendental-Anthropology
(A Sympathetic-Critical Study of the Philosophical Anthropology of Herman Dooyeweerd)
The christian transcendental-anthropology of the (law-)philosopher, Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977), is called anthropology because it is a philosophical study (i.e., a study within the framework of the science of cosmic totality) concerning the essence, the origin, and the unity of Man. It is called transcendental-anthropology because it analyses not only the structural possibility conditions of human life, but also because it is founded in a radical transcendental critique of theoretical thought, and also constitutes the heart of it. According to this critique, not some transcendental-logical ego but the transcendent-religious ego of Man is the point of synthesis of theoretical thought. Thirdly, the anthropology of Dooyeweerd is called christian because it is not governed by the Greek, the scholastic, or the humanistic ground-motive but by God's Word-revelation, i.e. by the biblical groundmotive of creation, fall, and redemption in Christ in the communion of the Holy Spirit.
Dooyeweerd's anthropology should have become the crown of his thinking but he has never felt confident to publish the anthropological work he had announced. The incomplete manuscript which he left constitutes one of the bases of the present study. He did include, however, anthropological thoughts in nearly all his writings, particularly in his main work, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought; the most important of those thoughts he summarized in his 32 "anthropological theses".
His anthropology is a christian reply to modern humanistic-philosophical anthropology such as was developed in the 20th century, particularly by thinkers like M. Scheler, H. Plessner, and A. Gehlen. It implies, in contrast to these men, a break-through, especially because Dooyeweerd refutes, in a philosophical way, the idea of the autonomy of human reason and also because of his Scripture-inspired answer to the central question of the unity of Man. Nevertheless, his view is neither a "biblical anthropology", which is a contradiction in terms, nor a theological anthropology, which presents only a theoretical systematization of the biblical knowledge of Man. It is a philosophical anthropology, based on a christian idea-of-law (cosmonomic idea), i.e. a transcendental ground-idea in which theoretical thought directs itself to the conceivably most profound questions concerning cosmic reality.
From these questions and their answers it is evident also how much anthropology is the alpha and omega of cosmology. These questions are:
(a) The question concerning the coherence of cosmic reality. This is, according to Dooyeweerd, a coherence of a number of mutually irreducible and yet internally coherent modalities or modal aspects of cosmic reality (e.g., the physical, biotic, logical, social, ethical aspect), which are recognized in their distinctness through scientific abstraction and synthesis. All entities function in each of these modalities, either as a subject or as an object; but Man has the unique cosmic position that he alone possesses subject functions in all modalities.
(b) The question concerning the unity of cosmic reality. The whole of temporal, modal-functional reality finds its supratemporal, supramodal and suprafunctional unity and concentration in the heart (the ego) of Man, which concretely-individually participates in the unity of the human race that is represented in the first and the last Adam, respectively. Ultimately the unity of the whole of cosmic reality lies in the fact that "all things" have been created "in Christ", the alpha and omega of all works of God.
(c) The question concerning the origin of cosmic reality. This lies in the sovereign will of God, the Creator, to Whom Man stands in a relation of dependence since his creation, and to Whom the religious impulse of his heart goes out. This impulse was created within him, although through sin his heart is drawn away from God to idols, and is only re-directed to God and His Word through re-birth and the illumination of the Holy Spirit in Christ.
Of great consequence, not only for the theory of the modalities but also for anthropology, is the proposal to distinguish, instead of Dooyeweerd's "psychical" modality, two different modalities: a perceptive modality (meaning-nucleus: perceptivity, sensationality), directly following upon the biotic modality, and a subsequent sensitive modality (meaning-nucleus: sensitivity, in the sense of affectivity, impulsivity, emotivity). Dooyeweerd already distinguished between (sensoric) "perceptions" and (internal) "feelings", although he felt that both are qualified by "feeling", ostensibly the meaning-nucleus of the "psychical" modality postulated by him. Besides this, in our view incorrect, lumping-together, Dooyeweerd also speaks in an inaccurate way about drives, instincts, etc., so that he did not arrive at a sharp view of the psychical. Like him, other authors also explicitly or implicitly described the meaning-nucleus of the supposed psychical modality as "perception and feeling" (Vollenhoven, Spier, Van Hulzen & Van Tilburg, De B. Kock, Van Eikema Hommes), and sometimes emphasized the differences between the two (Coetzee). Others did see a duality
but, implicitly, termed it differently, e.g. perception and behaviour (Dirkzwager), drives/instincts and emotionality (Van Dijk; cf. also Smelik). Some even distinguished three psychical moments: perceptivity, sensitivity, and emotionality (De Graaff), or drives, sensitivity, and instinctivity (Troost).
In the present study, we try to show that perception and sensitivity cannot be reduced to one meaning-nucleus without failing into antinomies; that phenomena like (higher) reflexes and instincts presuppose perception but not sensitivity; that in drives both a perceptive and a sensitive moment is present, hence our distinction between (purely perceptive) tendencies and (perceptive-sensitive) impulses; that in lower animals only perceptivity, and in mammals both perceptivity and sensitivity are found; that this is related to the possession of a differentiated system of limbic brain lobes in mammals (and in Man); that the so-called reptilian brain in Man constitutes the biotic substrate of perceptive, the limbic brain that of sensitive, and the brain cortex that of spiritive, i.e., logical to pistical, life.
In perceptive life, we distinguish visual, auditive, and other sensations, as well as the behavioural responses (reflexes, tendencies, instincts) immediately founded in them. In sensitive life, we distinguish affections, impulses, and emotions. The modal structure of the newly postulated perceptive and the subsequent sensitive modality turns out to involve, among others, orientational and referential anticipations of the perceptive to the sensitive, and similar retrocipations of the sensitive to the perceptive modality.
Next, as implied in Dooyeweerd's theory of the process of historical disclosure, a theory concerning individual-human development has been described. First, prenatal pre-spiritive disclosure, i.e., the disclosure of the natural modalities in the human foetus. This is followed by postnatal pre-spiritive disclosure, in which that of the perceptive and sensitive modality in the new-born child is of particular interest; here, parallels with "primitive" Man and with neurotics can be pointed out as well. In sensitive development, we distinguish a truncal, a limbic, and a cortical stage.
Even more important is the spiritive development in the young human, which directly depends on the developmental level of the culture in which the young person is brought up; in so-called "wolf-children," no spiritive development takes place at all. The first condition for such a development is, therefore, the disclosure of the cultural-historical modality. The second condition is the expansion of the pistical modality: the development of a certain cultural idea under the influence of an imparted religious ground-motive. Next, we note how, under the influence of the disclosed historical modality, the anticipations of the
logical modality are successively opened up (on this, Piaget in particular has thrown light), subsequently those of the lingual modality (here, Chomsky is to be mentioned and a comparison with chimpanzee experiments can be made), the social modality (of the utmost importance to the child), the economical, the aesthetical, the juridical, and the ethical modality (here, particularly Kohlberg is to be mentioned).
After the theory of the modalities, Dooyeweerd's theory of the identitystructures, and of the enkaptic intertwinements are also of great importance for anthropology. In these theories themselves, anthropological moments are already to be found as, e.g., the identity-structure of an entity can only be experienced intuitively. As to the theory of enkapsis, for Man (one-sided) foundational enkapsis turns out to be of particular interest. Man in his corporality can be understood as an enkaptic formative and structural whole, which constitutes an independent unity with its own identity but is an enkaptic building-up of mutually irreducible identity-structures ("human-structures") which are onesidedly founded in one another and together exhibit a "form-unity".
As we have distinguished a perceptive and a sensitive modality, we do not count four (like Dooyeweerd) but five such human-structures, which are all structures of the whole body (and must be carefully distinguished, therefore, from body parts), and find their structural coherence in the body form. The physical human-structure includes the chemical constituants and reactions, and the physical processes. It differs from the physical herbal-, animal-, and mammal-structure in its subjective structurality in that it has also internal object functions in the spiritive modalities. It possesses the post-biotic object functions essentially in each body cell, but one has to distinguish between primary organs (viz., the nervous system) and secondary organs.
In living organisms, the physical structure is enkaptically bound in the biotic structure, comprising the cell and tissue structure and the organic life processes. In plants, the biotic herbal-structure is the qualifying structure. It is not true that the autonomous nervous system plays a main role in the biotic structure in itself as has been asserted; this is the case only in the biotic mammal- and human-structure, where this nervous system is of particular importance to the post-biotic structures in which the biotic structure is bound. This is also true for certain parts of the brain and for the endocrine system. The brain stem and the cerebellum constitute the primary organs of the perceptive structure; the animal nervous system, too, is of great importance in the perceptive, and in the higher structures as well. By seeing the difference between these structures, insight is also possible in the distinct perceptive, sensitive, and spiritive types of motivation and learning (which can each be either perceptively or sensitively or spiritively qualified). The
perceptive, the sensitive, and the spiritive structure are evidently structures of the whole body as well. Compare, respectively, (a) the sense organs in the whole body and the alerting of the whole body in the so-called orienting reflex, (b) the alerting of the whole body by the sympathetic nervous system in the case of stress, and (c) the erect gait, the spiritual expression of the face, the undifferentiated hands (free for cultural labour!), the speech organs, the laughing-muscles, etc.
The perceptions (as well as their responses: reflexes, instincts, tendencies) in the perceptive, the feelings (affections, impulses, emotions) in the sensitive, and the so-called acts in the spiritive structure have been described. The spiritive human-structure is the sole identity-structure that does not possess any qualifying function because it is the direct field of expression for the supramodal, suprastructural human spirit (or soul, or heart, or ego); acts are inward and intentional performances of the spirit. Acts function in all modalities, can be qualified by any of the spiritive modalities, and are distinguished according to three dimensions: cognitive, imaginative-creative, and conative acts, which have been dealt with more extensively. Attention has also been paid to the unconscious, and to the unreflected and the reflected consciousness, and, in relation with this, to defense mechanisms. As to the individual-human character, distinction has been made between constitutional and operant factors in the higher human-structures, between character and temperament, and between acts, dispositions, and the ethos.
The main part of Dooyeweerd's anthropology is his view of the human ego (heart, soul, spirit). Initially, he sought the unity of the cosmic meaning-diversity in God's eternal counsel but, between 1926 and 1928, he developed the idea of the supramodality of religion and of the human heart, and, between 1928 and 1930, the idea of the temporality of the modal order and the supratemporality of the heart, in correlation with the prisma metaphor: the idea of temporal meaning-refraction and the supratemporal concentration of the modal order in the heart, and ultimately in the radix of the cosmos: the first and the last Adam, respectively. Dooyeweerd's idea of the supratemporality of the heart is supported by the fact of the religious orientation to Christ, by the time and eternity consciousness of Man, by the transcendental orientation of theoretical thought, by the apparent lack of true unity, fulness, integration etc. within temporal reality, and by the fact that the soul "survives" the dying of the temporal, modal-functional corporality at temporal death.
This "soul" should never be confused with the aristotelian-thomistic view, which considers the soul as a hypostasized complex of the higher temporal-modal functions, standing over against the material body as a hypostasized complex of the lower functions. This view must be
rejected because of its inner contradictions, its scientific as well as christian-philosophical untenability, and its pagan origin. Christian anthropology does not bear with substantialism or a dichotomy of two temporal complexes of functions; these doctrines could only crop up from an ignorance of the religious dependence relation, of the modal analogies, and of the identity-structures, and from a confusion of "naïve" and theoretical experience. Only through regarding the soul as the supratemporal and supramodal concentration point in Man, in which Man stands in a religious dependence relation to his Creator, a correct (philosophical) insight in the essence and functioning of Man's being is possible. Finally, we have tried to show that Scripture speaks in the same vein about these themes, whereas at the same time the dangers of biblicism and theologism have been tentatively avoided.
Unfortunately, Dooyeweerd's view of the ego has been frequently and greatly misunderstood; partly through some weaknesses in his presentation and in his theological views, but particularly through the philosophical presupposita of his opponents: scholastic or humanistic dualism, substantialism, biblicism, theologism, and temporalism concerning heaven(ly beings) and the new earth. Partly as a consequence of this, but also because of superficial study and subjective prejudices, many viewpoints of Dooyeweerd have been misunderstood, or views have been attributed to him that were not his at all. We have paid attention particularly to early congenial thinkers such as Vollenhoven, Popma, Spier, and Stoker, to the criticism of non-congenial authors such as Schilder and Nieboer, and to more recent critics such as Geertsema, Hart, Fernhout, Brüggemann-Kruyff, and particularly Douma and Steen. Apart from some minor points, Dooyeweerd's view of the ego could be fully maintained as well as amplified over against these opponents.
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